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M
y remarks focus on the challenges facing monetary policy in
a rapidly changing world. I start by examining the nature of
economic change confronting monetary policy in its daily
execution. In the absence of an unambiguous mandate to maintain price
stability and of a clear strategy to sustain it, the ongoing task of identify-
ing the latest economic shocks may easily distract the central bank from
the need to maintain a firm sense of direction in the longer run. Next, I
advance an interpretation of why the transition to European monetary
union—involving, by all standards, a state of acute uncertainty—could
be accomplished in the smooth manner in which it proceeded. In this
context, I highlight the role of two complementary policy perspectives.
These two principles of good policy are conducive to flexible and timely
responses to unfolding events and, at the same time, ensure policy
against myopia and short-termism and keep it solidly anchored to its
medium-term objective. 
Mr. Issing’s remarks, “Monetary Policy in a Changing Economic Environment,” are
on the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org. The author would like to thank Massimo
Rostagno for his valuable contribution.
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Cyclical and structural change
Economic change—and the uncertainty that it brings about—has
three dimensions. At the ground level we have cyclical, that is transitory
and/or nonstructural economic shocks coming along continuously. The
theory of economic policy normally assumes that such shocks are “addi-
tive” in nature, in that they do not pose a controllability problem for
policy. Nevertheless, they have to be properly identified in real time.
Econometric theory has spent decades devising sophisticated identify-
ing restrictions to isolate different types of shocks from the tangle that
appears in the data. The purpose of these exercises is to trace the propa-
gation profile of exogenous impulses through the economic system. But
nothing close to a consensus view has emerged. In fact, inference is
often nonrobust across various identification schemes.1
As a consequence, central bankers are given little guidance as to the
nature of the stochastic disturbances that drive the business cycle on
average. Of course, model selection itself is at stake here, as competing
modelling paradigms can only be put to a test—and discriminated—by
matching their quantitative implications with the dynamic shock
responses seen in the data. If the latter can only be generated on the
basis of controversial identification restrictions, the empirical bench-
mark becomes elusive. For all these reasons, central bankers must
exercise judgment when they encounter perturbations, and they cannot
rely on any single approach to reasoning through the implications of
such shocks. 
At a higher level, and a lower frequency, we have structural change.
This induces parameter—i.e., multiplicative—uncertainty, as innova-
tions tend not only to persist, but become embedded in the coefficients
through which key variables respond to exogenous forces. Monetary
policymakers, again, find themselves at a crossroads. For one thing, it is
extremely difficult for them to decompose in real time what is due to
structural change and what stems from normal cyclical sources of fluc-
tuation, as these events tend to come together. But, more
fundamentally, central bankers perceive the uncertainty surrounding
structural variation as of a higher order of magnitude—and of a differ-
ent nature—compared with the way parametric risk is treated in muchECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 17
of the literature. I believe this type of our measure of uncertainty is
closer, in this case, to a Knightian concept, wherein probability distri-
butions for model coefficients cannot be articulated.2
A further source of uncertainty, of a strategic sort, stems from the
endogenous—at times unpredictable—process whereby agents form
their expectations. This process has a strategic, game-theoretic flavor, as
the central bank and its way to respond to the events is very much part
of the picture, and in some way it is driving the formation of views
about the future. 
Incidentally, the identification of the disturbances stemming from
cyclical, structural or expectational disturbances is further complicated
by the ex post statistical revisions, which may at times overturn the
empirical platform on which central bankers have to make their deci-
sions in real time.3 And it should be superfluous to remind the reader of
the paramount measurement problems that cloud state variables, such
as the output gap, the NAIRU, the steady-state real interest rate, which
are of key importance in mainstream macroeconomic discussions. 
Institutional change 
Complexity reaches its climax in the presence of large-scale institu-
tional change, however. This source of change is sufficiently rare in
history to escape econometric testing and sufficiently severe to impart a
profound discontinuity in the data-generating process. Times of institu-
tional change are times in which the signal extraction problem for
central banks is most acute. Structural change may be associated with a
widely dispersed range of expectations. These, in turn, may behave
erratically and fail to coordinate on a focal point. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has some examples to tell in
this regard. When the ECB started conducting policy in 1999, area-
wide back data were only scantly available, many statistical indicators
were still under construction. More importantly, the presumption was
that the creation of the euro area would itself imply a major regime
shift. Therefore, the statistical patterns emerging from past data—if and
when made available by aggregation of national figures—might not be
informative of the structure of the new economic entity or might even
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granted that private agents could immediately form expectations consis-
tent with the new regime, and, thus, instability in behavior could not be
ruled out. In some sense, we were studying the evolution of a moving
object, which was changing for the very reason that it was being
observed, as in the famous Heisenberg paradox. Real time mispercep-
tion, false inference, Knightian uncertainty, all the usual professional
hazards of central banking, plus something else seemed to be com-
pounded—let’s be conservative—by a factor of three. 
Indeed, the ECB did preside over a monumental transition. The
money market, for one, underwent a historical transformation on the
eve of the launch of the euro in January 1999. Eleven national markets,
so diverse in terms of participants, operating conventions, settlement
structures, credit facilities, had to merge into a unified trading area
almost overnight. New payments systems for large-value transactions
were implemented. Capital markets traditionally protected by currency
fragmentation and national regulations were opened up to arbitrage and
straight competition. 
Yet, the transition was smooth and the abrupt switch in structural
relations, which many observers had seen in the offing, did not materi-
alize after all. Markets immediately recognized the new rules of the
game. They adjusted swiftly to the new monetary policy environment.
Since 1999, overnight rates have limited their fluctuations on the dates
of monetary policy announcements to less than 5 basis points on
average, a sign that policy was reasonably predictable.4 The ten-year
break-even inflation rate obtained from French index-linked bonds—a
crude measure of inflation expectations—has consistently signaled the
degree of credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy to maintain inflation
in line with its announced definition of price stability. This indicates
that markets have perceived our pattern of response to the events as
transparent and consistent over time. 
All this has to be measured against the magnitude of the distur-
bances that intervened in the course of the first three and a half years of
our existence. Since 1999 the euro area has weathered a number of
major economic or financial turbulences worldwide, preserving a degree
of monetary and economic stability that would have hardly been con-
ceivable before the advent of Monetary Union. The euro area has gone
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lived impact on inflation expectations. And a long trend of foreign
exchange depreciation—recently reversed—as well as a marked correc-
tion in stock prices since early 2000 have done little to shake the
confidence in the euro as a solid store of value. 
Anchoring expectations in a changing environment
How was all this possible? How could uncertainty of the highest
degree fail to leave a mark in the records? In my view, the ECB’s success
in anchoring expectations right from the start has not fallen from the
sky nor has it been entirely “inherited” from the past. Instead, I would
argue that our success can be attributed in good measure to the ECB’s
monetary policy strategy and the more general principles that underlie
our policymaking. Not least, it has been a reflection of our philosophy
that markets are powerful, sometimes overwhelmingly so, but, never-
theless, in need to be guided by a central bank, not meddled with. 
First, the way we committed ourselves to the overriding mandate to
be the guardians of price stability in the euro area—which we received
from an international treaty—anchored expectations in a time of accel-
erated change. The ECB’s announcement of a quantitative definition of
price stability—which is symmetric in the sense that it is incompatible
with inflation as well as with deflation—was immediately acknowl-
edged by our counterparts. It is important to add that price stability,
according to our definition, is to be maintained over the medium term.
The medium-term orientation of our monetary policy strategy and our
aversion to fine-tuning of short-term developments in prices and real
variables has helped to provide a firm compass while the economy was
sailing through the uncharted turbulent waters of 1999 and subsequent
years. It deflected the risk that amidst exceptional uncertainties, the
central bank may itself become an additional source of noise. Ulti-
mately, it provided a degree of leverage over expectations on the eve of
the transition to the new currency that could pin them down solidly to
the intended objectives of policy.5 The mandate and the independence
that it ensures endowed the new institution with a stock of credibility
that facilitated its operations and its interactions with the markets from
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Secondly, our strategy has helped to sort through a wealth of con-
flicting statistics and has provided a reliable road map and a sense of
direction.6 We have built into our strategy two complementary perspec-
tives over the workings of the economy, one in which money and credit
are attributed a key role in the formation of prices. And one in which
real variables receive pre-eminent attention as the determinants of price
pressures in the short term, and where monetary factors are treated only
implicitly. Under what we call the first pillar, we thoroughly monitor
monetary and credit indicators on the basis of those analytical frame-
works that can sensibly incorporate developments in money. Under this
pillar, we announce a reference value for M3 growth, which, if realized
on average over the medium term, should in normal circumstances
indicate that policy is consistent with the achievement of price stabil-
ity.7 I shall return to this principle shortly, as it will constitute the focal
point of my remaining observations. Under the second pillar, we review
a broad set of nonmonetary indicators and assess their implications for
price setting over a short- to medium-term horizon. 
These two mutually reinforcing perspectives provide robust indica-
tions for a policy aimed at price stability, which survive the
cross-checking of competing models and the rise-and-fall cycles of fash-
ions in economic thinking. 
Keeping a firm sense of direction 
But how can a monetary policy framework induce prompt action
in the face of ever-changing circumstances and, at the same time, main-
tain a firm sense of direction? Here, there is clearly potential for
destabilizing mechanisms setting in. Constantly bombarded by eco-
nomic news, a central bank risks becoming hypnotized by the latest
indicator, by the markets’ likely reaction to the latest indicator, by the
markets’ anticipation of the central bank’s response to the latest indica-
tor, and so on into infinity. This mechanism can lead monetary policy
gradually astray from its foremost role of providing a firm medium-
term anchor for the economy. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 21
So, at the risk of oversimplifying, let me now turn to consider two
general principles of prudent monetary governance that may help
central banks to reconcile the need for prompt action and a firm
medium-term orientation. 
(1) First, a central bank always needs to tailor action upon the
origin, the magnitude, and the nature of the shocks that hit the
economy from time to time. As I tried to argue above, this is a highly
demanding exercise because shocks do not come about with labels.
They have to be identified first, in real time. But there are no shortcuts
or excuses—no simple rules linking policy to one or two privileged
indicators can substitute for an accurate examination of shocks and a
careful analysis of their potential for transmission into prices over a suf-
ficiently extended span of time ahead. A corollary to this principle is
that the horizon for policy action cannot be set in advance, as I shall
argue more extensively below. 
(2) Second, a central bank can benefit from keeping an eye fixed on
the single long-term compatibility condition that monetary economics
has to offer to practitioners, free of model-specificities and restrictive
assumptions. Namely, that over a sufficiently extended period of time,
money should grow at a rate that is consistent with trend growth in real
output and the central bank’s definition of price stability. In more
general terms, this principle embodies the ancient wisdom of the quan-
tity theoretic law—that it is the growth of money that ultimately
anchors the development of prices.
Each one of these two principles—if taken individually—entails
some guidance for the monetary policymaker, which, however, is
partial. A monetary policy strategy—such as the one adopted by the
ECB—can be seen to provide a robust framework for monetary policy
decision-making, which heeds these two general principles in a way in
which they reinforce and complement each other.
The lesson suggested by the first principle is that disturbances have
to be evaluated as they come about, according to their potential for
propagation, for infecting expectations, for degenerating into price
spirals. And preventive action should not be delayed, as it becomes clear
that shocks—whatever their origin—may take hold in the economy
and evolve into inflationary or deflationary pressures over the medium
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the type of shock, the initial macroeconomic conditions, the prevailing
financial sentiment, the international environment, and many other
variables. Therefore, the horizon for monetary policy cannot be set in
advance. Sometimes it pays to look far ahead, beyond the average lag of
monetary transmission. Sometimes the economy can be expected to
return to price stability within a much shorter horizon. In all events, a
central bank has to ensure that expectations be quickly reverting to its
declared objective of policy. 
The policy recommendation implicit in the second principle is
simple: Do not ignore the information that monetary developments
contain for medium-term price developments, even if the relationship
between money and prices may not come through strongly at shorter
horizons. This principle also provides an antidote against the pitfalls of
exceedingly forward-looking rules.8 Looking into the future with a vig-
ilant eye, as the first principle suggests, is a fundamental element of
good policy. But, by constantly looking ahead, one should not lose sight
of the intended trajectory of policy and the need to act consistently over
time. One should always be constantly aware of possible inadvertent
slippages from the intended long-term direction. In the end, monetary
policy needs to ensure a path of money supply that is consistent with
maintaining price stability over the medium term. Trends in money
velocity can be incorporated in such a longer-term benchmark to
account for the evolving structure of the monetary exchange. But, in
the end, there can be no sustained inflation without systematic accom-
modation in monetary aggregates.
The key point that I want to bring out here is that neither of
these two principles can stand alone. Both are in need for mutual
cross-checking. The first principle suggests that the central bank move
its interest rate policy instrument in reaction to the disturbances that
are considered to have implications for price stability in the medium
term. But these actions—taken at successive points in time—may not
prove to be consistent over time and could, thus, cumulatively result
in systematic divergence from the desired objective. Thus, the course
of policy followed in the attempt to counter perturbations via shock-
specific responses needs to be ascertained against the straight line
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that line turns out to have been departed from for an extended period
of time, then policy, sooner or later, has to be brought back onto the
right course. 
Incidentally, it is worth noting that historical episodes of asset
price “bubbles” have tended to be accompanied by strong and persist-
ent deviations from that reference line. Thus, a monetary policy
strategy that monitors closely monetary developments and measures
them against a medium-term reference growth rate may—as an impor-
tant side effect—also contribute to limiting the emergence of
unsustainable developments in asset valuations. I shall come back to
this below. Asset prices, by themselves, are not a suitable goal for mon-
etary policy. In the long run, the relative price of assets is mainly driven
by underlying real factors—e.g., technological developments and pref-
erences—which cannot be controlled by monetary policy. But
monetary aggregates and credit developments in situations of financial
instability can signal to what extent consumption, investment, labor,
and price-setting decisions are being affected by conditions of financial
disorder, excessive euphoria, or disillusion. 
Conversely, the second principle too, if followed in isolation, is
subject to potential difficulties. As first pointed out by William Poole
more than thirty years ago, there are many short-term shocks to the
amount of money demanded for each unit of nominal income, which
monetary authorities would do better ignoring and accommodating.
These unexplained innovations may be simply related to seasonal noise in
the money creation system or transitory forces driving around transac-
tions habits. They may reflect reversible movements in the preference for
liquidity, in- or out-flows of foreign exchange transiting through check-
able accounts or else. In the case of Europe, it cannot be ruled out that the
process of financial integration may have affected the income velocity of
monetary aggregates. In these circumstances, having to hit a constant
rate-of-growth target for, say, base money on a near-term horizon would
result in ample fluctuations in short-term interest rates. And this instabil-
ity would likely be transmitted to prices and output, causing unnecessary
fluctuations in these variables. In this context, the first principle of good
policy, prescribing a careful filtering of disturbances, provides important
safeguards against such policy-induced instabilities. In fact, it underlies
the ECB’s decision to adopt a reference value for monetary growth, which24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
is not a monetary target. And it also supports the need to look at mone-
tary developments from a medium-term perspective. Nevertheless, as
long as money demand relationships are reasonably stable—as has been
the case in Europe in contrast to the United States—information from
monetary developments should provide robust indications of medium-
term price pressures.
Paraphrasing an expression of Paul Samuelson, we were given two
eyes: one to watch money and credit aggregates and one to watch every-
thing else. Ultimately, these two policy perspectives are to be combined
in a single strategy that subsumes them both in a unified—albeit
complex—and robust framework for action. This strategy lends policy-
makers an accurate perspective over the economy to respond
expeditiously to the events and, at the same time, ensures them against
systematic slippage.
The controversy over the reference value for money growth 
Our policy approach has encountered some criticism, however.
This criticism builds on two premises. First, we sometimes hear that
there exist ready-made statistical gauges that summarize and condense
all the information that a central bank needs to know about the state of
the conjuncture. One of these privileged indicators that has gained
prominence is an inflation forecast. Another one is some measure of
slack, i.e., the distance between actual and potential activity. 
Second, we are told that as long as the central bank moves its inter-
est rate instrument with sufficient vigor in response to, say, an inflation
forecast, it does all it is required to pin down prices and keep the
economy on track. A rule of the type advanced by John Taylor is a good
example of this line of thinking.
The ECB has expressed its reservations on the use of such simple
interest rate rules ignoring money elsewhere, and I shall not repeat
those arguments here.9 What I would like to do, instead, is go through
a simple, purely suggestive exercise in historical interpretation. Three
past episodes are selected, which, in hindsight, are regarded as having
involved various degrees of unintentional monetary policy mistakes. I
have asked myself the question whether a simple interest rate rule, à la
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venting those mistakes. And finally, I have tried to figure out whether a
policy taking the quantity theoretic equation seriously, and using
money stock indicators in addition, could have been instrumental in
yielding a better macroeconomic outcome. 
These episodes comprise the Federal Reserve System’s management
of the “Roaring ’20s” and of the deep crisis that followed; Japan’s mon-
etary policy in the second half of the 1980s in the face of a tremendous
asset price buildup; and, finally, monetary policy over the same period
in what would later become the euro area. The three episodes are
depicted in Charts 1, 2, and 3. In all examples, a measure of excess
money growth is used. This is defined as the difference between the
Chart 1
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1920s: EXCESS MONEY
GROWTH, REAL ASSET PRICE GROWTH, AND
MONETARY POLICY*
*Note: Excess money growth is defined as ∆ 4e = ∆ 4m–[∆ 4 p* + ∆ 4 y*] + ∆ 4 v*, where ∆ 4 denotes the
four-quarter difference operator and m, p*, y*, and v* stand for (logs of) the actual stock of M2, the
price objective, real potential GDP, and long-term velocity of circulation, respectively. The price
objective is normalized to 1, potential output is obtained applying an HP-filter to actual real GDP,
trend velocity for 1923-1930 is constructed by interpolating a linear trend to realized velocity over
1921-1929, and by imposing a structural break afterward to reflect the sharp contraction in nominal
GDP, primarily led by a fall in producer prices. The Taylor rule has been calibrated to an equilib-
rium real interest rate equal to the average real discount rate observed in the first two quarters of
1923, and imposing an inflation coefficient 1.5 and an output gap coefficient of 0.5. 
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actual growth rate of nominal broad money and the rate that would be
implicit in the quantity relation with real income growing at its poten-
tial rate, inflation at the central bank’s objective, and velocity at its
long-term trend. 
Needless to say, the list of caveats is even longer than usual. First,
there is obviously some selection bias to be discounted: These episodes
have not been chosen at random. Secondly, in none of these three periods
was anything close to a Taylor rule debated in the profession as a viable
option for guiding central bank action. The very notions of “potential
output,” “target inflation,” “real equilibrium interest rate,” “money veloc-
ity trend,” although put forward by a number of academics, were either
Chart 2
JAPAN IN THE 1980s: EXCESS MONEY GROWTH, REAL
ASSET PRICE GROWTH, AND MONETARY POLICY*
*Note: Excess money growth is defined as ∆ 4e = ∆ 4 m–[ ∆ 4 p* + ∆ 4 y*] + ∆ 4 v*, where ∆ 4 denotes
the four-quarter difference operator and m, p*, y* and v* stand for (logs of) the actual stock of
M2+CDs, the price objective, real potential GDP, and long-term velocity of circulation, respectively.
The Bank of Japan implicit inflation objective has been set equal to a yearly rate of 1.7 percent (the
average of the Japanese CPI inflation between 1984 and 1991), potential output is obtained apply-
ing an HP-filter to actual real GDP, trend velocity is constructed by interpolating a linear trend to
realized velocity over a twenty-year period, starting in 1980. The Taylor rule has been calibrated to
an equilibrium real interest rate equal to the average real uncollateralized overnight rate observed in
the first two quarters of 1984, and imposing an inflation coefficient 1.5 and an output gap coeffi-
cient of 0.5.
Sources: Bank of Japan and ECB staff calculations.

























Yearunknown or intentionally ignored in the 1920s at the Federal Reserve
Board. And the same concepts, while available and, in fact, widely used
by central bank economists in the 1980s, were and are open to all sorts of
measurement controversies. To mention only one, regarding the euro area
in the 1980s, the “inflation objective” of a group of twelve central banks
conducting more or less independent policies is a sufficiently elusive con-
struct to warrant a great deal of caution. 
Having said all this, I believe this exercise is, nonetheless, instruc-
tive.10 At a minimum, it illustrates how different statistical gauges can
yield conflicting policy signals and how badly central banks can some-
times do if they choose to neglect the fundamental arithmetic
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Chart 3
THE EURO AREA IN THE 1980s: EXCESS MONEY
GROWTH, INFLATION, AND MONETARY POLICY*
*Note: Excess money growth is defined as ∆ 4e = ∆ 4 m–[∆ 4 p* + ∆ 4 y*] + ∆ 4 v*, where ∆ 4 denotes the
four-quarter difference operator and m, p*, y* and v* stand for (logs of) the actual stock of M3, the
price objective, real potential GDP, and long-term velocity of circulation, respectively. The euro-area
implicit inflation objective was obtained by an error-correction formula, whereby the level of past
realized inflation was corrected by subtracting 7.5 percent of the discrepancy between that level and
the “price norm” of 2 percent adopted by the Bundesbank. Potential output is obtained applying an
HP-filter to actual real GDP, trend velocity change is set to –1.0 percent per year during the entire
period under consideration. The Taylor rule has been calibrated to an equilibrium real interest rate
equal to the average three-month real interest rate observed in the first two quarters of 1984, and
imposing an inflation coefficient of 2.08 and an output gap coefficient of 0.08. The inflation and
output gap coefficients are estimated using a GMM technique during the period 1980-2001.
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embodied in the quantity relation. Chart 1, for instance, suggests that
had the Fed looked at a measure of excess money growth, had it not
rejected the then novel normative framework offered by the quantity
theory of the business cycle, it would have probably realized that mon-
etary policy was too lax, not too tight—as suggested by the Taylor rule
standard for much of the 1920s.11 Intriguingly, the measure of excess
money growth appears to move in sympathy with the profile of the his-
tograms that represent the growth rates of real stock prices in New York.
It becomes positive—and significantly so—in those years in which the
market is most buoyant. And it turns negative when the market pauses
or falls. Perhaps one can conclude that money was growing too fast in
the years immediately preceding the crash, compared with the long-
term necessities of an inflation-free economy operating at potential.12
Perhaps that excess of monetary injection was spilling over into the pur-
chase of financial assets.
However, looking at the discount rate only, to the exclusion of the
monetary indicator, and measuring the historical path of the discount
rate against the benchmark provided by the Taylor rule, one would
draw the opposite indication.13 While significant by a Taylor rule stan-
dard, the degree of tightening was perhaps not commensurate with the
surging risk appetite that was driving up market rates and yet luring
more and more investors into the financial gamble. The extent of the
abrupt policy reversal in the first half of 1929, which many contempo-
rary observers quote as a primary cause of the disorderly fall in the
market, is also more apparent from the quantitative than the interest
rate indicator. 
A similar picture emerges from the Japanese data. While a Taylor
rule would have signaled an appropriate-to-tight stance of policy until
well into 1989, excess money was building up in the second half of the
1980s, finally at an accelerating pace.14 Apparently, the Bank of Japan
had expressed early concerns that rapid money growth might predispose
the “dry wood” needed to set the asset market on fire.15 Deputy Gover-
nor Yutaka Yamaguchi (1999) echoed those concerns in a recent
insightful intervention in Jackson Hole. But probably no tightening—
in excess to that already apparent in the data—could have been justified
to the public on the back of persistently subdued inflation and growingECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 29
measures of productivity. Again, it seems that a monetary policy gauge
focused on inflation and a measure of slack only—to the neglect of
money—would have failed to sound the alarm.16
The euro area in the 1980s provides an alternative picture: the con-
nection between excess money growth and goods, as opposed to asset
price, inflation. The disinflationary process that had occurred in the
first half of the decade, aided by the sharp decline in the international
energy prices, was followed by a gradual reversal. Monetary authorities,
although not off track by a Taylor rule standard, were slow to spotlight
those developments and somehow fell behind the curve. Once more,
money rising in excess of its long-term reference value could have
warned of impending risks to price stability. 
Of course, simple graphical co-movements cannot be emphasized
too much, let alone taken to prove any casual relationship. And the
obvious objection to my story is that there are other episodes in the
history of industrialized countries in which money growing temporarily
out of line with fundamentals has failed, ex post, to ignite an asset
bubble or to tolerate an inflationary process under way. Furthermore,
alternative indicators, such as private credit, may at times outperform
broad money in signaling that observed swings in asset prices are
abnormal and may prelude to financial distress.17
But the absence of a fire does not mean that we should not pay for
fire insurance. Rather, the question is whether, ex ante, the probability
of a policy mistake is sufficiently large to warrant concerns and, at some
point, intervention. These concerns and this threat of intervention on
the part of the central bank may be sufficient to deter that risk in the
first place.18
Of course, there are shocks to money growth that, in retrospect,
appear to have been due to pure velocity noise. If we had an all-encom-
passing model of how real and financial forces interact, if we were
entirely confident that our model suffered from no omission of key
underlying relationships, incorporated no functional mis-specification,
was exactly estimated, then these velocity shocks would be readily rec-
ognizable. They would show up as the residuals of the complex money
demand equation in the model. But no model and no central bank in
the world is at that stage yet. Incidentally, it is a well-known feature of
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demand condition that they incorporate displays a rather poor fit to the
data. A central bank cannot place too much trust on the coefficients
and the residuals that this equation generates. There definitely seems to
be more to the link between money, income, and prices in the data than
captured by such simple interpolations. This fact, in my view, should
urge us to accelerate our efforts to develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of how money interacts with price setting and how financial
and real variables can influence each other.
So, central banks have to face dilemmas of the following nature.
Does a shock to observed money quantities reflect pure noise that will
unwind in due course, or does it bear information over the forces
driving the setting of prices? Is an observed shift to more liquid portfo-
lios a sign that agents are building up transaction balances in order to
finance higher spending and/or in anticipation of higher prices in the
near future? Or is it a mere signal of a heightened precautionary motive,
a by-product of financial anxiety, of market jitters, which will reverse
themselves sooner or later without economic implications? In particu-
lar, to what extent is an unexpected surge in money a counterpart to
easy credit—which can feed asset market speculation or excess demand,
with unsettling consequences stemming from both? The experience
accumulated in the 1920s and the 1980s suggests that conditions of
easy credit and rapid monetary expansion, while escaping simple checks
based on inflation and output gap indicators, can inflict lasting damage
on the economy. Suggestively, many stories were told in Japan in the
1980s about the relation between money supply and prices having
become unstable and unreliable. 
A central bank cannot systematically dismiss shocks of this nature
as nuisances. Ultimately, the obvious question to ask is what has
changed in the relation linking money holdings and consumption-
saving decisions, a connection which, as I argued above, is not
well-described in available models. But in a situation of doubt, one
should always be reminded that the—provided money is properly
measured—quantity theoretic regularity will, at the end, reassert itself.
So, if price stability is to be preserved consistently over the medium
term, a persistent violation of that regularity should have an impact on
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Concluding remarks
I conclude with a number of observations that have been recurrent
in my remarks above. 
First: There is no simple escape for a central bank from a serious
analysis of economic change, which comes in the form of shocks and
noise. These changes are often opaque and present themselves in dis-
guise, but they may contain information that cannot be discarded on a
priori grounds. There is no escape to a serious analysis of economic per-
turbations. Certainly, following deceptively simple policy rules of one
sort or another is no viable cure to complexity.
Second: The change in money demand is one of the most difficult
to decipher. Looking ahead, these shocks may even augment in number
and magnitude—as has been the case in the United States and else-
where in the past—which would make filtering and reading the signals
coming from money a difficult undertaking. But the central bank
should not deny itself the opportunity to take advantage of all the infor-
mation that it carries with itself. The conviction that money matters
and contains invaluable information for policy is shared across central
bankers wedded to different monetary policy strategies.19
Third: While looking into conjunctural signals, a central bank
should never fall prey to myopia and short-termism. Monetary theory
has provided a compass for measuring how the course of policy has devi-
ated in the past and will likely deviate in the future from the straight line
consistent with price stability and a sustainable growth path. This quan-
tity theoretic reference should be consulted regularly and taken seriously.
Monetary policy cannot react mechanistically to monetary variables, and
the weights that a central bank attaches in its considerations to the
various headline measures of money supply are state dependent: They
cannot be set in advance. Thus, there may be extended periods of time in
which observers do not detect reactions to monetary indicators. In our
strategy, for example, the weights are conditional on the analysis of mon-
etary shocks, which is conducted under the first pillar. This analysis is
aimed at purging the developments in monetary aggregates of the noise
with which they are usually observed. This analysis yields more reliable
measures that can be used for policy orientation. 32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
But if deviations in these measures of money from the long-run tra-
jectory consistent with price stability are ample and persistent, a central
bank should intervene if the anchoring properties of money are to be
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ENDNOTES
1 Various alternative methods to identify monetary policy shocks generally pro-
duce comparable qualitative results, in the sense that inference is reasonably robust
across a large subset of identification schemes. However, this does not appear to be
the case for exercises aimed at identifying shocks to technology. Furthermore, there is
some disagreement as to the extent to which different shocks have been responsible
for output variation in the past. See, among others, L. Christiano and others (1999)
and J. Galí (1999). 
2 To  make an example of this type of unstructured uncertainty: What is the
admissible range of parameter change induced by increased globalization, new tech-
nologies, or continuous financial innovation? Are both sources of structural change
only going to show up in a faster transmission of shocks cross-border. Or is the emer-
gence of genuinely global financial operators going to fundamentally alter the trans-
mission of monetary policy at a local level? Likewise, the developments of new
financial products are a potent force behind enhanced flexibility and macroeconomic
resilience. But the very technologies that appear capable of better allocating risk and,
thus, containing economic imbalances may also be imparting new forms of vulnera-
bilities that can intensify the business cycle. Because of their increasing degree of
complexity, the new instruments can potentially expose the overall system to height-
ened risk if miscalculations are large. Again, assigning probabilities to these equally
plausible courses of events appears hazardous on a priori grounds.
3 On the policy consequences of real time misperceptions induced by ex-post
statistical revisions, see A. Orphanides (2000). 
4 See V. Gaspar and others (2001), and P. Hartmann and others (2001). 
5 On the connection between a central bank’s predominant focus on price sta-
bility, its aversion on real fine-tuning, and its credibility assets, see V. Gaspar and F.
Smets (2002). 
6 For a more precise description of the ECB monetary policy strategy, see ECB
(1999, 2000) and O. Issing (2001).
7 Interested readers can find a precise account of the methodology that we fol-
low to construct the reference value in C. Brand and others (2002). 
8 A discussion of the problem of excessive forward-lookingness in monetary pol-
icy is provided in M. Woodford (2000).
9 Interested readers are referred to ECB (2001). 
10 The results presented in the charts prove reasonably robust across a number
of admissible assumptions and specifications. However, in the case of Charts 1 and 2,
the analysis becomes less and less reliable as the horizon is stretched to cover periods
following the crash of the stock markets in late 1929 and 1990, respectively. This is
due to fundamental uncertainties clouding the way key parameters, such as the per-
ceived equilibrium real interest rate and the expected trend in money velocity, react
to the deepening of the economic crisis that ensued in both cases. 
11 In a recent review of this period, T. Humphrey (2000) has argued that the
Fed’s refusal to endorse the policy prescriptions implicit in the works of I. Fisher in
those years contributed to the fatal policy mistakes that have been described in the
classical book by M. Friedman and A. Schwartz (1963-1993). The monetary theory
of the Great Depression, as expounded in that book, still constitutes the leading34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
interpretation of that piece of monetary history. The contention that an easy policy
was fueling the stock market bubble was always a fixation of various Austrian econo-
mists at the time. 
12 That monetary policy should aim at price stability, even under the price-tak-
ing rules of the international gold standard, was one of the main principles advocated
by I. Fisher in his classic 1911 book on the purchasing power of money. Other
prominent monetarists of the time espoused the principle and elaborated monetary
benchmarks which, if observed by the Federal Reserve, would have yielded an out-
come of price stability: See, for example, the 1924 article written by C. Snyder, an
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In fact, these theories of “man-
aged money” were consistent with the workings of the international gold standard, as
the gold-reserve-to-note-and-deposit-liabilities ratio of the Federal Reserve System—
at an average of 65 percent over the 1920s—was considered in excess of what was
imposed by the System’s international gold-standard commitments. In the words of
Friedman and Schwartz (1963-1993): “[The Federal Reserve System’s] own gold
position plus prevailing international monetary conditions enforced recognition of
the difference between its problems and those of earlier central banks. It had to face
explicitly the need to develop criteria and standards of monetary policy to replace the
automatic operation of the gold standard.” (page 240.) 
13 Throughout the 1920s, annualized inflation never exceeded 2 percent (with
the exception of the first quarter of 1921, when it strongly rebounded from the pro-
found deflation of 1920), and from the end of 1924 it remained persistently negative
for the rest of the decade. Consumer price deflation became perceptible in 1928,
when it averaged -1.2 percent. Deflation started accelerating in the course of 1930 to
reach a peak of almost –8 percent between the end of 1932 and the beginning of
1933. 
14 B. McCallum (2000) confirms the good fit of a Taylor rule to the actual pol-
icy orientation of the Bank of Japan in the 1980s. He also finds that a rule involving
a target for base money growth would have provided important insights to the poli-
cymakers in those difficult circumstances. 
15 The expression is quoted in K. Okina, M. Shirakawa, and S. Shiratsuka
(2001) who provide a comprehensive overview of the period, stressing the role of
money as an indicator of market excesses. According to their account, the Bank of
Japan had raised the issue of money growing too fast already in 1986. 
16 It is also notable how excess money starts contracting sharply already in the
first half of 1991, immediately following the cyclical peak in the Japanese economy.
The Taylor rule, instead, persistently points to a need for tightening. It should be
noted that Japanese inflation averaged 1.7 percent during the period covered in
Chart 2. However, the average increase in consumer prices from the start of 1986—
when the early signs of the asset price buildup became visible—to the end of 1989
was a mere 0.9 percent. 
17 The close correlation between domestic credit growth and the change in (a
composite indicator of various) real asset prices is stressed in a recent contribution by
C. Borio and P. Lowe (2002). 
18 This interpretation of rule cross-checking in terms of insurance against per-
verse outcomes is consistent with that advanced by a recent paper by L. Christiano
and M. Rostagno (2001). 
19 See, for example, M. King (2002), and L. Meyer (2001). ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 35
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